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Another classic of EU sports jurisprudence: Legal implications of Case C-325/08 
Olimpique Lyonnais v. Olivier Bernard and Newcastle United 
 
Katarina Pijetlovic 
The core of this article rests with the argument that the Court in Bernard has, in fact, 
followed the suggestions of Advocate General regarding accepted models of training 
compensation. Furthermore, it is recognised that whereas Bernard does not depart from the 
well-established analytical framework in free movement cases, it does depart from Bosman 
on the point of the Court’s appraisal of the suitability of training compensation within the 
confines of that framework. It is exactly this fact that gives some weight to the otherwise 
symbolic and unnecessary reference to Article 165(1) TFEU and paragraph 40 of the 
judgment. The Court’s justification of the restrictions on free movement for out-of-training-
contract players contrary to the Bosman judgment in which the same restrictions for out-of-
professional-contract players were deemed illegal can be taken as both: exception to 
prohibition on age discrimination in EU law and the prima facie validation of the current 




The debate surrounding the nature of the relationship between EU law and sport began in 
1974 with the Walrave judgment in which the Court of Justice famously held: “the practice 
of sport is subject to Community law only in so far as it constitutes economic activity 
[…]”.1 Rules of ‘purely sporting’ interest that are limited to their proper objectives and 
have nothing to do with economic activity, such as the composition of sport teams, national 
teams in particular, are excluded from the scope of the Treaty.2 This became known as the 
sporting exception in EU law. In Donà, the Court reformulated and confirmed this 
                                                          
 Lecturer in EU Law at Tallinn Law School, Tallinn University of Technology, and a researcher in EU sports 
law at the University of Helsinki, Department of Private Law.  
1 Case 36/74 Walrave and Koch v. Union Cycliste Internationale and others [1974] ECR 1405, paragraph 4. 
2 Ibid. paragraphs 8 and 9. 
 2 
exception. Hence, EU law does not apply to  rules or practices ‘[…]excluding foreign 
players from participation in certain matches for reasons which are not of an economic 
nature, which relate to the particular nature or context of such matches and are thus of 
sporting interest only,’ and are limited to their proper objectives.3 
 
Almost two decades later, in Bosman,4 the Court was asked to consider a directly 
discriminatory 3+2 rule and non-discriminatory international transfer rules which restricted 
the professional activities of football players. Citing Donà, the Court extended the sporting 
exception to further exclude from the scope of the Treaty non-discriminatory sporting 
activities and rules which, although economic in nature, can be justified on non-economic 
grounds related to the particular nature and context of certain matches and which are 
limited to their proper objectives. Sporting rules which had economic implications and 
could not satisfy these requirements were brought under the existing analytical framework 
of the Treaty free movement provisions, including objective justification framework as 
established in Kraus and Gebhard.5 Against this setting, ‘in view of the considerable social 
importance of sporting activities and in particular football in the Community,’ the Court 
accepted as legitimate the objective of ‘encouraging the recruitment and training of young 
                                                          
3 Case 13/76 Gaetano Donà v. Mario Mantero [1976] ECR 1333, paragraphs 14-15. 
4 C-415/93 Union Royale Belge Sociétés de Football Association and others v. Bosman and others [1995] 
ECR I-4921. 
5 Ibid., para. 104. Case C-19/92 Dieter Kraus v. Land Baden-Württemberg [1993] ECR I-1663, para. 32 and 
Case C-55/94 Reinhard Gebhard v. Consiglio dell’Ordine degli Avvocati e Procuratori di Milano [1995] 
ERC I-4165, para. 37. 
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players’.6 Finally, it is interesting to observe that the Court assessed the application of 
objective justification with regard to the directly discriminatory 3+2 rule after it found that 
objectives put forth were not persuasive or legitimate enough to benefit from the exception 
established in Walrave and Donà because they applied to all official matches and thus to 
‘the essence of the activity of professional players’.7 
 
The Court’s reasoning in Bosman, coupled with the boom in commercialisation of the 
sports industry in the 1990s has been the reason behind the proliferation of EU policy 
instruments in the area of sport. In the absence of direct legislative competence in the area, 
numerous policy documents were adopted by EU institutions including the 1999 Helsinki 
Report on Sport8 and the Nice Declaration on Sport in 2000.9 What these documents have 
in common is their core mission to reconcile the interests of different stakeholders, in other 
words, to preserve the traditional values of sport and the autonomy of sport governing 
bodies on the one hand, and to have their rules and practices comply with the economic 
provisions of the Treaty on the other. Accordingly, sport bodies enjoy a form of autonomy 
to organise and regulate their respective sport conditional upon compliance with these 
                                                          
6 Ibid., para. 106. 
7 Ibid., para. 128. See also R Parrish and S Miettinen ‘The Sporting Exception in European Union Law’ (The 
Hague, T.M.C. Asser Press, 2008). 
8 Report from the Commission to the European Council with a view to safeguarding current sports structures 
and maintaining the social function of sport within the Community framework The Helsinki Report on Sport 
Brussels, 10 December 1999 COM(1999) 644 final. 
9 Declaration on the specific characteristics of sport and its social function in Europe, of which account should 
be taken in implementing common policies 13948/00, Annex to the Presidency Conclusions, Nice European 
Council Meeting, December 2000. 
 4 
economic provisions, whereas the Union has an equivalent duty to ‘take account of the 
social, educational and cultural functions inherent in sport and making it special’10 in the 
implementation of common policies. The Commission has set out its approach in a 
comprehensive 2007 White Paper on Sport,11 a strategic orientation document which aims 
inter alia to illustrate the application of EU law to sport. 
 
In December 2009, the Lisbon Treaty amendments gave ‘complementary’ competence to 
the Union in the area of sport.12 Article 165(1) TFEU (under Title XII on education, 
vocational training, youth and sport) states: ‘The Union shall contribute to the promotion of 
European sporting issues, while taking account of the specific nature of sport, its structures 
based on voluntary activity and its social and educational function.’ The ruling of the Grand 
Chamber of the Court in Bernard13 is the first to make reference to this ‘sports article’ even 
though the facts of the case pre-date the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty. Bernard 
embraces the sentiment of European sports policy and insists on certain parameters for the 
application of law in the sports sector within the established objective justification 
framework. It legitimises restrictions on player mobility by means of proportionate training 
compensation schemes which rely on ‘real training costs’. Although this case does not 
conflict with Bosman, in the sense that it does not depart in any way from the well-
established analytical framework, it nevertheless does  the earlier judgment in terms of the 
                                                          
10 Ibid. 
11 White Paper on Sport Brussels, 11 July 2007 COM(2007) 391 final. 
12 Articles 2(5) and 6(e) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.  
13 Case C-325/08 Olympique Lyonnais SASP v. Olivier Bernard and Newcastle United UFC, judgment of 16 
March 2010, not yet reported. 
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Court’s appraisal of the suitability of training compensation within the confines of that 
framework and ultimately in the effects produced. It is exactly this fact that gives some 
weight to the otherwise largely symbolic and unnecessary reference to the Article 165(1) 
TFEU and leads to the assumption. Nevertheless, until we have another case to confirm or 
deny this assumption, it would be premature to draw any firm conclusions about the stare 
decisis value of Bernard in this respect.  
 
Facts of the case 
 
In 1997, the French football club Olympique Lyonnais (Lyon) and the 17-year old Olivier 
Bernard entered into a training contract for three seasons with effect from 1 July that year. 
The legal dispute between the parties arose three seasons later when Bernard refused to 
accept a one year professional contract offered to him by Lyon to take effect as of 1 July 
2000. Instead, in August 2000 he signed a professional contract with Newcastle United FC 
and moved to England.  
 
At the material time, the employment of football players in France was regulated by the 
Charte du Football Professionne (the Charter), which had the status of a collective 
agreement. Trainee players between the ages of 16 and 22 and employed by a professional 
club under a fixed-term training contract belonged to a category known as joueurs espoir. 
Article 23 of the Chapter provided that the club is entitled to require a trainee to sign a 
contract as a professional player on the expiry of the training contract. Should the player 
refuse, he was prohibited from signing with another French club for a period of three years 
without the written agreement of the club in which he was a joueur espoir. If the club did 
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not offer him a professional contract, he was free to sign with a club of his choice without 
any compensation being due to the club that trained him. Although this rule implied that 
compensation is due if the player refuses to sign a professional contract with that club, the 
Charter contained no scheme for compensation. The club could nevertheless rely on 
Article L. 122-3-8 of the French Code du travail (Employment Code) to bring an action for 
‘damages corresponding to the loss suffered’ against the joueur espoir for breach of 
contractual obligations flowing from Article 23 of the Charter. 
 
When Bernard left for Newcastle United FC, Lyon considered that the compensation 
principle should extend outside of France and sued him and his new club. It sought an 
award of EUR 53 357 in damages, the amount corresponding to the remuneration Bernard 
would have received over the period of one year under the professional contract with Lyon 
which he refused to sign. The judgment of the Conseil de prud’hommes, ordering Bernard 
and Newcastle United FC jointly to pay Lyon damages of EUR 22 867, was quashed by the 
Cour d’appel which considered that obligation on the joueurs espoir under Article 23 of the 
Charter contravened freedom of movement under Article 39 EC (now Article 45 TFEU). 
Lyon then appealed to the Cour de cassation which, in July 2008, referred two related 
questions to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling, essentially asking i) whether 
Article 39 EC (now Article 45 TFEU) precludes the provision of a national law requiring 
joueur espoir to pay damages in the described context, and ii) if so, does the need to 
encourage the recruitment and training of young professional players constitute a legitimate 
objective capable of justifying such a restriction. 
 
Analytical overview of the judgment 
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The existence of a restriction on freedom of movement for workers 
The Court first dealt with the question of the restrictive nature of the compensation scheme. 
This part of the judgment does little but confirm settled case-law. Citing Bosman (and the 
reference to Walrave and Koch in that judgment), the Court reminded us that Article 45 
TFEU applies not only to actions of public authorities but also to rules of any other nature 
aimed at regulating gainful employment in a collective manner, thus bringing the Charter 
under the scope of the Treaty.14 Furthermore, the Court used the obstacle approach to find 
that the Charter, constituting neither a prohibition on signing a contract with a club in 
another Member State nor discrimination on the basis of nationality, nevertheless 
discourages the player from exercising his right of free movement and makes the exercise 
of that right less attractive. Thus, it constitutes a restriction contrary to Article 45 TFEU. 
The Court makes no distinction between sport and any other sector at this stage of its 
analysis. The contested rules or practices are either restrictive or not, notwithstanding the 
specific characteristics of the sector.15 
 
Justification of the restriction – legitimate objective 
Paragraph 38 of the Court’s judgment follows a familiar roadmap for analysing the 
existence of justifications for measures restricting the free movement provisions of the 
Treaty. Accordingly, a restriction may be accepted only if it pursues ‘a legitimate aim 
compatible with the Treaty and is justified by overriding reasons in the public interest’, and 
                                                          
14 Para. 30 of the judgment. 
15 Paragraph 30 of the Advocate General’s opinion in this case says that ‘the specific characteristics of sport 
in general, and football in particular, do not seem to me to be of paramount importance when considering 
whether there is a prohibited restriction on freedom of movement. […]’ 
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the application of that restrictive measure is a) capable of ensuring achievement of that aim, 
and b) does not go beyond what is necessary for that purpose. The Court goes on to confirm 
paragraph 106 of Bosman: ‘[…]in view of the considerable social importance of sporting 
activities and in particular football in the European Union, the objective of encouraging the 
recruitment and training of young players must be accepted as legitimate.’16 Therefore, the 
said objective was easily recognized as legitimate by reference to previous case-law. It is 
apparent from the language of the Court that the social importance of sport plays a crucial 
role in legitimating this objective and that it would probably not be accepted as such in 
(m)any other employment sectors.  
 
Standard of application of the proportionality principle  
This aspect of the judgment deserves more attention. The Court states that: 
‘In considering whether a system which restricts the freedom of movement of such players is 
suitable to ensure that the said objective is attained and does not go beyond what is necessary 
to attain it, account must be taken, as the Advocate General states in points 30 and 47 of her 
Opinion, of the specific characteristics of sport in general, and football in particular, and of 
their social and educational function. The relevance of those factors is also corroborated by 
their being mentioned in the second subparagraph of Article 165(1) TFEU.’17 
For the first time, the Court mentions the social and educational function of sport at this 
stage of analysis and refers expressly to sport as a sector which requires specific 
characteristics to be taken into account in the examination of possible justifications. This 
does not represent a novelty in terms of the relevant factors taken into account by the Court 
                                                          
16 Para. 39 of the judgment. 
17 Para. 40 of the judgment. 
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at different stages of objective justification analysis. The novelty is in the express language 
of the Court, coupled with the reference to Article 165(1) TFEU. 
 
Although not relevant in Bernard itself (since, here, a non-discriminatory restriction was at 
issue), it is interesting to remember that under the traditional approach, the analytical 
framework first required labelling the measure as directly discriminatory, indirectly 
discriminatory, or non-discriminatory but restrictive on the exercise of the freedoms 
conferred. By allowing the directly discriminatory 3+2 rule in Bosman, discriminatory 
transfer windows in Lehtonen18, and quota on foreign players in Kolpak19 and Simutenkov20 
to be considered under the objective justification framework as opposed to the express 
derogation framework, and therefore treating it as if it were an indirectly discriminatory or 
non-discriminatory restriction, it could be thought that the Court has effectively introduced 
the concept of the ‘specificity of sport’ to the traditional classification process.21 Sport is 
not the only sector in which the Court has taken such a detour for directly discriminatory 
                                                          
18 Case 176/96 Jyri Lehtonen and Castors Canada Dry Namur-Braine ASBL v. Fédération royale belge des 
sociétés de basket-ball ASBL (FRBSB) [2000] ECR I-2681. 
19 Case C-438/00 Deutscher Handballbund v. Kolpak [2003] ECR I-4135. 
20 Case C-265/03 Igor Simutenkov v. Ministerio de Educación y Cultura, Real Federación Española de 
Fútbol, [2005] ECR I-2579. 
21 The traditional measure-classification stage in the analysis is nonetheless still evident in the Court’s 
analytical structure in several cases. See C Barnard  ’The Substantive Law of the EU’ 2nd ed. Oxford UP, 
2007, pp. 279-282. 
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measures.22 But sport is the only sector where it has taken this approach consistently, thus 
making it a rule in the application of EU freedom of movement law to sports, which could 
be attributed to the specificity of sport. In Bernard, the Court’s novel reference to Article 
165(1) TFEU might signal that the provision has not just confirmed but has in fact given 
some additional weight to the specificity and socio-educational function of sport, which 
could prove just enough to influence the outcome in certain cases. This is, however, evident 
only when considered in the context of the suitability assessment and the Court’s departure 
on that matter from the judgment in Bosman. The discussion in the following section 
illustrates this point. 
 
Suitability of training compensation systems 
Turning to the issue of the suitability of training compensation schemes in light of the 
specificities of sport and its social and educational function, the Court said that 
‘41. […]the prospect of receiving training fees is likely to encourage football clubs to seek new 
talent and train young players (see Bosman, paragraph 108). 
42. The returns on the investments in training made by the clubs providing it are uncertain by 
their very nature since the clubs bear the expenditure incurred in respect of all the young 
players they recruit and train, sometimes over several years, whereas only some of those 
players undertake a professional career at the end of their training, whether with the club which 
provided the training or another club (see, to that effect, Bosman, paragraph 109). […] 
                                                          
22 See, for example, C-67/97 Bluhme [1998] ECR I-6717 (biodiversity), Case 2/90 Commission v. Belgium 
(Walloon Waste) [1992] ECR I-4431 (environmental protection), Case C-19/92 Kraus [1993] ECR I-1663 
(protection of public against misleading use of academic titles). 
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44. Under those circumstances, the clubs which provided the training could be discouraged 
from investing in the training of young players if they could not obtain reimbursement of the 
amounts spent for that purpose where, at the end of his training, a player enters into a 
professional contract with another club. […] 
45. It follows that a scheme providing for the payment of compensation for training where a 
young player, at the end of his training, signs a professional contract with a club other than the 
one which trained him can, in principle, be justified by the objective of encouraging the 
recruitment and training of young players. However, such a scheme must be actually capable 
of attaining that objective and be proportionate to it, taking due account of the costs borne by 
the clubs in training both future professional players and those who will never play 
professionally (see, to that effect, Bosman, paragraph 109).’ 
 
Compare this reasoning of the Court with paragraph109 in Bosman in which it held that 
‘[…] because it is impossible to predict the sporting future of young players with any certainty and 
because only a limited number of such players go on to play professionally, those fees are by nature 
contingent and uncertain and are in any event unrelated to the actual cost borne by clubs of training 
both future professional players and those who will never play professionally. The prospect of 
receiving such fees cannot, therefore, be either a decisive factor in encouraging recruitment and 
training of young players or an adequate means of financing such activities, particularly in the case 
of smaller clubs.’23 While, in Bosman, training compensation schemes were viewed as 
unsuitable for the achievement of the objective of encouraging the recruitment and training 
of young players, in Bernard they were deemed suitable. Furthermore, in paragraph 46 of 
her Opinion, AG Sharpston said: ‘[…] Rules such as the one in question here are therefore 
perhaps not decisive in encouraging clubs to recruit and train young players. None the less, 
                                                          
23 C-415/93, para. 109. 
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such rules ensure that clubs are not discouraged from recruitment and training by the 
prospect of seeing their investment in training applied to the benefit of some other club, 
with no compensation for themselves.’  
 
Interpreting the word ‘encourage’24 as meaning to ‘not discourage’ seems to be a linguistic 
modification, enabling the Advocate General to depart from the decision in Bosman as 
regards the suitability of training compensation schemes. 25 But why would AG Sharpston 
undertake such a linguistic maneuver and why would the Court follow her Opinion on that 
point? One possible reason is discussed above and relates to the change of direction with 
regard to the weight given to socio-educational functions. The other explanation would be 
that the Court simply did not expressly acknowledge the departure from Bosman in this 
respect, when it in fact changed its opinion as regards the importance of the contingent and 
uncertain nature of compensation fees in assessing the suitability of the measure. AG Lenz 
in Bosman did not find that the nature of compensation fees prevented him from reaching 
the conclusion that they are appropriate means for attaining the aim of encouraging 
training and recruitment of young players, but the Court, back then, did not follow him on 
this point.  
 
                                                          
24 As required by the objective accepted as legitimate in para. 39 of Bernard and para. 108 of Bosman. 
25 The objective required that the restrictive rule encourages clubs to train and recruit young players, and not 
that it did not discourage clubs from doing so.  The aim of ’not discouraging’ presents lower bar to attain for 
restrictive rule to be found suitable for its attainment than the aim of ’encouraging’. Therefore, the restrictive 
rule (training compensation) used to attain the objective so re-worded and modified will more likely be found 
suitable in the former, but not in the wording of the latter. 
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Proportionality: calculation of training compensation 
Finally, addressing the system of compensation in Bernard, the Court saidThe Court 
offered only very general guidelines on the accepted methods of calculating compensation. 
Accordingly, such methods should be related to compensation for the real training costs 
incurred by the club (the criteria for calculation of which should ideally be determined in 
advance). What constitutes ‘real training cost’ is the issue left open. Moreover, paragraph 
45 tells us that the costs to take into account in designing a scheme are not just those 
associated with training future professional players but, also, costs associated with training 
those players who will never turn professional. 
 
Weatherill suggests that interpreting the criteria noted in paragraphs 46-47 of the judgment 
in Bernard to mean that only a scheme tied directly to the actual costs of training one 
player is permitted ‘might be too narrow an interpretation’, and that the criterion in 
paragraph 45 ‘might conceivably be interpreted to mean that the compensation payable by 
those who succeed as professionals might be inflated beyond the costs incurred in their 
particular case to allow also some coverage of training costs incurred but wasted on those 
players who fall by the wayside’.26 Lindholm also suggests that the Court favoured a total-
training-cost-model and ‘appeared’ to have rejected the Advocate General’s suggestions of 
an individual-training-cost-model.27 Although this is a possible interpretation of the 
                                                          
26 S Weatherill ’The Olivier Bernard case: how, if at all, to fix compensation for training young players?’ 
International Sports Law Journal 1-2, 2010, p.5. 
27 J Lindholm ’Case C-325/08, Olympique Lyonnais SASP v. Olivier Bernard and Newcastle United UFC, 
Judgment of the Court of Justice (Grand Chamber) of 16 March 2010, not yet reported’ Common Market Law 
Review 47, 2010, p. 1192. 
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judgment, there is an alternative explanation which, although not as straightforward, 
appears more convincing. There are several considerations which lead to the conclusion 
that the criterion in paragraph 45 is an additional criterion that applies only in schemes in 
which the new employer, as opposed to a player, is liable to pay the compensation, and that 
the Court has in fact followed the suggestions of AG Sharpston on the point of setting 
different criteria for ‘employer pays’ and ‘player pays’ schemes. 
 
First, paragraph 45 appears in the part of the judgment in which the Court addresses 
compensation schemes in general and not ‘player pays’ schemes in particular, whereas 
paragraphs 46-47 address the scheme in the main proceedings, i.e. a ‘player pays’ scheme. 
It would be unreasonable to expect the Cour de cassation to recognize this criterion as 
applicable to the case before it. The Court has left out the criterion of ‘and those who never 
play professionally’ in its answer to the preliminary reference because it did not want the 
Cour de cassation to reach the decision using that criterion to determine the dispute. If it 
were applicable, the Court could easily have added this criterion at the end of paragraph 49. 
Additionally, in paragraph 45, as well as in the preceding reasoning, the Court cites 
Bosman, in which the ‘employer pays’ scheme was at issue. It would have made all the 
difference were the attainment of the ends in that case dependant on ‘player pays’ means. If 
it were, the Court in Bosman would not have implied that training compensation had to be 
related to the ‘actual cost borne by the clubs of training both future professional players and 
those that will never play professionally’. 
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This leads to my second point. Namely, the Court could not have intended to subject a 
young trainee to the burden of a total-training-cost-model,28 because it could have the 
disproportionate effect of actually preventing him from moving to a club in another 
Member State. This is especially true with respect to sports other than football in which the 
costs of training might be as high but the players’ services are much less valued. Such an 
approach would fail to satisfy proportionality strictu sensu. To illustrate this in more 
concrete terms, we can look at the FIFA training compensation system, according to which 
an employer is liable to pay up to EUR 90 000 per year of training if it offers the first 
professional contract to a young player. The costs are supposed to reflect approximate total 
training costs. According to FIFPro29 comment on FIFA’s compensation rules, history has 
shown that ‘such fees operate as a significant and sometimes definite restraint that can not 
only undermine player earnings but also put players out of the game’.30 If there is any truth 
to this claim regarding the FIFA ‘employer pays’ scheme, for football trainees to be held 
liable for similar total-training-cost-covering-sums, and for trainees in other sports to be 
held liable for equivalently restrictive amounts in their respective sports (which could be 
legally installed in any sport if paragraph 45 is interpreted as applying to ‘player pays’ 
schemes), would mean preventing most players from moving anywhere after completing 
their training. Has the social and educational function along with the specificity of sport 
really been raised to such high level of importance to be capable of justifying these 
consequences for freedoms guaranteed by Article 45 TFEU? Although it could become 
more important in the future, depending on how the sport governing bodies react to 
                                                          
28 Discussed in the next section of this article.  
29 FIFPro is the Federation Internationale Des Associations De Footballeurs Professionnels.  
30 FIFPro report on the Joint FIFA/UEFA Negotiation Document (International Transfer of Players), available 
at www.uefa.com. 
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Bernard, this discussion is currently of more theoretical than practical value when placed in 
the context of the present-day state of affairs, to which we now turn. 
 
In the ten years since the litigation started, FIFA has introduced a system operated on the 
‘employer pays’ basis, France has changed its rules for internal transfers in football to 
reflect that system, Bernard finished his footballing career, and Lyon’s lawyers probably 
forgot they ever started the litigation as the club’s budget would not be affected at any 
detectable level by whatever Bernard would have been held liable to owe. In addition, 
sports today do not apply ‘player pays’ schemes. For example, basketball, handball, 
football and rugby run ‘employer pays’ schemes. Cricket, fencing, hockey, cycling, polo, 
volleyball, ice-hockey, skiing, swimming and baseball have no training compensation at all. 
One explanation which renders the judgment valuable in the present day is that the criterion 
in paragraph 45 applies to any type of scheme including ‘player pays’ schemes, which is 
something that I have argued against above. The only other possible explanation is that the 
paragraph 45 criterion is strictly intended to apply to systems in which employer bears the 
burden of training compensation. 
 
This explanation of the judgment is in line with AG Sharpston’s suggestions. She rejected 
two models of compensation: one based on the player’s prospective earnings, because it is 
susceptible to manipulation; and the other based on the club’s prospective loss of profits, 
because it is too uncertain.31 Two other models discussed in the Opinion were the total-
training-cost-model and the individual-training-cost-model. ‘[…]If it is necessary to train n 
                                                          
31 See para. 50-51 of her Opinion.  
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players in order to produce one who will be successful professionally, then the cost to the training 
club (and the saving to the new club) is the cost of training those n players. It seems appropriate and 
proportionate for compensation between clubs to be based on that cost. For the individual player, 
however, only the individual cost seems relevant’, regardless of the overall training costs. So, the 
Advocate General suggested the total-training-cost-model as appropriate for ‘employer 
pays’ schemes and the individual-training-cost-model in any instance of ‘player pays’ 
schemes. 
 
Weatherill considers that the Court chose not to explore the nuances suggested by AG 
Sharpston because ‘calculation is in any event complicated by the practical reality that 
players are trained in groups, not individually: the cost of training twenty players is lower 
than the cost of training one multiplied by twenty thanks to realisation of economies of 
scale.’32 But it may well be that the Court has left the nuisance of the nuances to the clubs 
and/or their governing bodies. After all, football clubs nowadays, especially those playing 
in the higher divisions of a national league, are professional undertakings with huge 
turnovers that must have proper accounting systems to manage their revenues and 
expenditures and, therefore, they should be able to assess quite precisely the expenses 
involved in the training of young players.33 It does not seem to be too different or too much 
harder to calculate the costs of training one player than it is to calculate the costs of training 
                                                          
32 Weatherill, op. cit., note 26, p.5. 
33 S Van den Bogaert ’Practical Regulation of the Mobility of Sportsmen in the EU Post Bosman’ (Kluwer, 
The Hague, 2005) pp. 256-257.  
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one player plus the fluctuating number of other players but not of entire trainee squad.34 It 
is true that the calculations may prove to be more difficult for smaller clubs. However, even 
small clubs have to manage their accounts during the financial year. If they do not have an 
in-house accountant, they can hire one specifically to devise a cost template and 
demonstrate how to calculate costs of training, which fixed and variable costs to 
include/exclude, which deductions to make, and so on. It is a one-time hire and a one-time 
expense (which can then possibly be labelled as a cost of training and shifted to another 
party).  
 
Regardless of the method used for calculating costs, sums of compensation must be set 
between suitability and necessity, i.e. they must be high enough to be capable of attaining 
the objective but they must be the lowest possible that can achieve that objective. It can be 
rightfully claimed that ‘player pays’ schemes based on the individual-training-cost-model 
are not suitable to achieve the objective of encouraging clubs to train and recruit young 
players, simply because of the very low amounts of compensation involved. This is also 
recognised by AG Sharpston: ‘[…] investment in training would be discouraged if only the 
cost of training the individual player were taken into account when determining the 
appropriate compensation.’35 Therefore, in team sports, ‘employer pays’ schemes based on 
total training cost seem to be the only model that can satisfy all of the legal criteria, and are 
                                                          
34 It takes an average of 10 players to produce one professional. See European Commission, Education of 
Young Sportspersons, Final Report, August 2004, p. 49, and R. Blanpain ’Legal Status of Sportsmen and 
Sportswomen under International, European and Belgian National and Regional Law’ (The Hague, Kluwer, 
2003) p. 52.  
35 See para. 52 of her Opinion. 
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therefore the right way to go. The reason that the Court ruled that individuals should 
compensate only for the costs of their own training (under the interpretation of judgment 
presented in this article) in a team sport such as football is to enable the Cour de cassation 
to settle the issue between the parties to the main proceedings. This ruling can also be 
important for the future, however, in the event of the establishment of mixed systems where 
the duty to compensate is divided between the player and the employer, or the player and 
the common compensation pool (which would make the system pass the suitability test).  
Regarding the applicability of the judgment to schemes existing today, the criteria for team 
sports and ‘employer pays’ schemes are set out in paragraph 45 of the judgment. In addition 
to this, ‘real training costs’ (in paragraphs 46 and 50) should be taken as meaning i) costs 
for training one individual player in ‘player pays’ schemes (to settle the case at hand and 
any eventual future systems where individual would be liable to pay), and ii) costs for 
training one individual player plus the number of players that do not make it professionally 
taking into consideration the appropriate ‘player factor’ (the ratio of players who need to be 
trained to produce one professional player) in ’employer pays’ schemes. Paragraphs 46 and 
50 refer only to the link between the compensation payable and the actual costs incurred – 
the Court does not insist on precise congruence.36 It is enough that the relevant calculations 
are based on the broad criteria set by the Court. 
 
The answer to the questions referred  
‘49. […] the answer to the questions referred is that Article 45 TFUE does not preclude a 
scheme which, in order to attain the objective of encouraging the recruitment and training of 
                                                          
36 See Weatherill, op. cit., note 26, p.4. 
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young players, guarantees compensation to the club which provided the training if, at the end 
of his training period, a young player signs a professional contract with a club in another 
Member State, provided that the scheme is suitable to ensure the attainment of that objective 
and does not go beyond what is necessary to attain it. 
Here, the Court omitted to complete the sentence with the paragraph 45 criterion ‘taking 
due account of the costs borne by the clubs in training both future professional players and 
those who will never play professionally’. The final word flowing from the reasoning in 
paragraphs 46-48 was that the ‘player pays’ scheme in Bernard failed to satisfy the 
necessity principle because damages were calculated, ‘in a way which is unrelated to the 
actual costs of the training’.37 So the ruling of the Court was in favour of Bernard and 
Newcastle United FC. But the reason for that is not because the Court considered training 
compensation schemes in sports illegal, but because this particular compensation scheme 
was considered illegal. 
 
The current FIFA training compensation system 
 
Article 20 and Annex 4 of the FIFA Regulations38 set out the rules for training 
compensation. Accordingly, training compensation shall be paid to a player’s training 
club(s): (1) when a player signs his first contract as a professional, and (2) on each transfer 
of a professional until the end of the season of his 23rd birthday.39 The obligation to 
                                                          
37 Para. 50 of the judgment. 
38 FIFA Regulations for the Status and Transfer of Players available at 
http://www.fifa.com/mm/document/affederation/administration/01/27/64/30/statusandtransfereinhalt2010.pdf  
39 Ibid. Article 20. 
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compensate applies whether the player is transferred during or at the end of his contract.40 
A special provision that applies for transfers from one association to another within the 
EU/EEA stipulates that if the former club does not offer the player a contract, no training 
compensation is payable unless the former club can justify that it is entitled to such 
compensation. Such an offer must be at least of an equivalent value to the current 
contract.41 
 
In order to calculate the compensation due for training and education costs, national 
football associations divide their clubs into a maximum of four categories in accordance 
with the clubs’ financial investment in training players. The training costs are set for each 
category and are said to correspond to the amount needed to train one player for one year 
multiplied by an average ’player factor’, which is the ratio of players who need to be 
trained to produce one professional player. The training costs are established on a 
confederation basis for each category of club as well as the categorisation of clubs for each 
association.42 UEFA43 has established the following sums for Europe: Category I clubs 
EUR 90 000, category II clubs EUR 60 000, category III clubs EUR 30 000 and category 
IV clubs EUR 10 000.44 So, when a player that has been trained for five years by club X, a 
                                                          
40 Ibid. 
41 Annex 4, FIFA Regulations for the Status and Transfer of Players. 
42 Ibid. 
43 Union of European Football Associations. Confederation for Europe. 




category III club, refuses to sign their first professional contract with club X and instead 
signs with club Y, a category II club, club Y will owe 45 000 EUR times the number of 
years that the player spent with club X (when a player moves from a lower to a higher 
category, the average amount between the two categories applies). The total amount owed 
for five years of training a player in this case would come to EUR 225 000. If the player 
were to move from first to first category club after five years of training, EUR 450 000 
would be the applicable amount. In Europe, only six national associations have clubs 
classified as belonging to category I. About half of the national associations have only 
category III and IV clubs.  
The FIFA Dispute Resolution Chamber reviews disputes concerning the amount of training 
compensation payable and has discretion to adjust this amount if it is clearly 
disproportionate in the case under review.45 A question which has received increased 
attention after Bernard is whether the FIFA training compensation system is compatible 
with the requirements of EU law. Prima facie, it appears that Article 20 and Annex 4 of the 
FIFA Regulations satisfy the general criteria of the judgment in Bernard. The European 
Commission has already given an informal green light to these rules. However, until 
someone actually challenges the rules, we will not be able to say with certainty which 
provisions are perhaps precluded by the EU law and need amendment. 
 
The feature of the system that appears most controversial is the fact that payable flat sums 
are set on the level of confederation.46 The actual costs of training are not the same or even 
                                                          
45 Annex 4, FIFA Regulations for the Status and Transfer of Players. 
46 In other words, UEFA as confederative body sets sums for all Europen national football associations, and 
other regional governing bodies set the sums in their respective regions.  
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similar in all European countries due to differences in economic conditions. Therefore, it 
seems more desirable that the flat rate sums for different categories of clubs should be set 
by national associations to reflect more accurately the real costs of training incurred, as 
required by Bernard.47 On the other hand, the existence of a FIFA Dispute Settlement 
Chamber that has the power to adjust the sums in individual cases is a positive feature of 
the system which can be used as an argument against claims that sums are clearly 
disproportionate. It follows implicitly from the judgment in Bernard that precise sum of the 
real training costs is not a must. 
Final remarks 
Let us remind ourselves that the judgment in Bosman lead to the abolition of transfer fees 
for out-of-contract professional players who then became free agents whereas, under 
Bernard, out-of-contract trainee players were not considered to be free agents and 
compensation fees were given a green light. This differential treatment of young trainees 
who embark upon a professional career and professional players can, inter alia, be 
considered to be an exception to the prohibition on age discrimination in EU law.48 It can 
also be a preliminary indication of the validity of FIFA rules that have for years maintained, 
contrary to Bosman, transfer fees for out of contract trainees. In this sense, Bernard 
represents a restriction on the scope of Bosman. 
                                                          
47 See on this point also S. Van den Bogaert, op.cit. note 33, and  J-C Drolet ‘Extra Time: are the new FIFA 
Transfer Rules doomed?’ Ch. 10 in S. Gardiner, R. Parrish and R. Siekmann, ‘EU Sport Law and Policy’ (The 
Hague, TMC Asser Press, 2009). 
48 See Article 10 TFEU and Council Directive 2000/78 establishing a general framework for equal treatment 
in employment and occupation (Official Journal L 303/16, 2 December 2000). 
